ABSTRACT In this paper, we study the physical layer security performance under K -tier heterogeneous cellular network during both downlink and uplink phases. Especially, Nakagami-m fading is used to capture the characteristics of line-of-sight (LoS) propagation. Using stochastic geometry tool, tractable expressions of connection probability are derived accordingly. Upper-bound expression of secrecy probability is derived through only considering the closest eavesdropper, whose rationality is validated theoretically. While lowerbound expression of secrecy probability is derived through using Jensen's inequality. Moreover, we demonstrate the effects of parameter setting upon network connection and secrecy performances through numerical simulation. For example, Rayleigh fading and LoS scenario (an extreme Rician case) can be regarded as special cases of this paper through properly setting m 0 value. Connection probability is insensitive to BS density during downlink phases, while it is an increasing function of BS density during the uplink phase. We also find that connection probability is an increasing function of m 0 value. Secrecy probability is insensitive to m 0 value, while it is an increasing function of BS density during both downlink and uplink phases.
I. INTRODUCTION
The broadcast nature of wireless channel poses a threat to legitimate communication between legitimate nodes. Traditional wireless communication is safeguarded through cipher encryption at the upper layer, which assumes the eavesdroppers have limited computational capability and fail to crack the encryption process [1] . Rapid advance in computing technique makes it feasible for these invaders to acquire the secret message. Recently, physical layer security (PLS) is attracting increasing interests, which utilizes the physical characteristics of wireless channel to enhance secrecy performance.
Physical layer security, which aims to achieve the information-theoretic security, was first introduced by Shannon [2] in the notion of perfect secrecy. Wyner [3] studied the wiretap channel through exploiting the secrecy capacity, which defines the maximal achievable rate to guarantee secrecy against eavesdroppers. Later, [4] and [5] extended Wyner's work to non-degraded and additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels. [6] studied the PLS performance under fading channels, through considering the probability of positive secrecy capacity and secrecy outage probability.
Under point-to-point scenario, there has been various works concerning the PLS performance analysis over various fading channels. Legitimate/eavesdropping channels are subject to Rayleigh/Rician [7] , Rician/Rayleigh [8] , Rician/Rician [8] , and Nakagami-m/Nakagami-m [9] , [10] , [27] channels. In addition, secrecy performance are also investigated over α − µ, Stacy (Generalized Gamma) and Generalized-K fadings [11] - [13] , which provide more general fading models for secrecy performance evaluation.
Under multi-point and large-scale random scenario, [14] analyzes network connection and secrecy performance during downlink phase when multi-antenna BSs, singleantenna UEs and non-collude single-antenna eavesdroppers (Eve) are assumed. Reference [15] considers the connection and secrecy performances during uplink phase.
Note that Rayleigh fading is assumed when considering small-scale fading factor in [14] and [15] , which is actually an ideal model for factual channels. On one hand, rayleigh fading is less accurate in matching actual channel, because rayleigh fading adopts the ideal assumption that infinite equivalent random signals combine and no dominant signal exists. On the other hand, under denser BS deployment (especially in HCN), the probability of line-of-sight (LoS) channel increases. Thus it happens in a large probability that there exists dominant signal components. Reference [16] captures the effects of line-of-sight (LoS) and non-line-ofsight (NLoS) propagations upon large-scale fading, which are not included in small-scale fading. Note that small-scale fading influences the power ratio between the LoS and NLoS signal components, it is necessary to consider the smallscale fading distribution and adopt proper model for channel characterization. References [17] , [28] adopts the Nakagamim model to characterize small-scale fading factor, while a recent work [18] investigates the HCN scenario under the κ-µ shadowed fading channels, which takes various fadings as special cases. But both PLS performance and uplink phase are beyond the scope of [17] , [18] , and [28] .
In this paper, we incorporate the Nakagimi-m fading (for small-scale fading), downlink/uplink phase and PLS performance into concern. We adopt Nakagami-m fading as the small-scale channel fading model for the following reasons. On one hand, although less tractable, Nakagami-m fading is more accurate in matching factual channel than Rayleigh fading, especially LoS channel in an urban area [31] or dense HCN scenario [17] . On the other hand, Nakagami-m model can well capture the characteristic of LoS and NLoS components through properly setting m value. Rayleigh and Rician can be regarded as special cases of Nakagami-m model. Different from [7] - [13] , [27] , we study the secrecy performance under multi-point HCN scenario. Different from [14] , we consider Nakagami-m model and uplink phase, additionally. Different from [15] , we consider Nakagami-m fading for channel characterization. Different from [16] , we consider network PLS performance and Nakagami-m model for smallscale fading, additionally. Our work is not only a special case and simplification of [17] and [18] , because we derive more tractable results under Nakagami-m model and consider the secrecy performance additionally. For connection performance, we derive the analytical expressions of connection probability during downlink and uplink phases. For secrecy performance, we derive the upper-and lower-bounds of the secrecy probability. To the best of our knowledge, network secrecy performance has not been studied when Nakagamim fading channel, downlink/uplink phases and PLS performance are jointly considered, which motivates our work.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II depicts the system model. Section III and IV derive the analytical results of connection probability and secrecy probability, during downlink and uplink phases, respectively. Section V gives the simulation results and Section VI concludes this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a K -tier heterogeneous cellular network during both downlink and uplink phases. K {1, 2, ..., K } denotes all the BS tiers. Locations of tier-t BSs, UEs and Eves, are assumed to be scattered as independent 2-D homogeneous Poisson Point Process (PPP) t , u and e , with density λ t , λ u and λ e . UEs and BSs are legitimate destinations during downlink and uplink phases, respectively, while Eves are wiretappers who attempt to intercept the secret information. Else, all BSs, UEs and Eves are assumed to be equipped with single antenna.
A. CHANNEL MODEL AND TRANSMIT POWER
Both large-scale and small-scale fading are considered in this paper. For large-scale fading, standard pass loss propagation model is assumed. For small-scale fading, independent quasistatic Nakagami-m fading model is considered in the paper.
During downlink phase, transmit power of tier-t BSs is fixed as P t . During uplink phase, fractional power control (FPC) is adopted [19] , and transmit power of the UE is dynamically adjusted according to the distance r between UE and its serving BS, which satisfies P (t) = P u r βα , where β is the fractional path loss compensation, and α is the path loss exponent. Thus, signal power received by a destination BS from a UE at a distance r away can be expressed as P (r) = P u r βα |h| 2 r −α , where r −α denotes the path propagation loss, and h is the channel gain that satisfies the Nakagami-m distribution. h satisfies nakagami-m distribution, and |h| 2 satisfies the Gamma distribution (m 0 , 0 m 0 ). As a special case, when β = 1, the received signal power will be irrelevant with the distance r between the UE and BS.
B. FREQUENCY REUSE AND INTERFERENCE
Universal frequency reuse is adopted in the network [20] , where all the cells share the same frequency resource. As a result, UE will inevitably be interfered by other BSs during downlink phase, while BS will be interfered by the active UEs of other cells during uplink phase. Within a single cell, BS adopts TDD or FDD scheme to eliminate interference between its serving UEs.
C. USER ASSOCIATION
The maximum received signal strength association scheme is assumed [21] , where a typical UE o tends to connect to the BS providing the largest averaged received signal power (ARSP). Thus, the typical UE will be associated with the ith tier-t BS as (t, i) = arg max t∈K,i∈ t ∩B(0,D(t))
where r t,i denotes the distance between the typical UE and the ith tier-t BS. B(0, D(t)) denotes the circle area, in which the averaged received signal from a BS to the typical UE is above a preset threshold τ [14] . Thus, from the threshold condition P t r For the purpose of readability, we summarize all the notations in Table 1 , which keeps consistent along the following sections.
III. CONNECTION AND SECRECY PERFORMANCE DURING DOWNLINK PHASE
In this section, we consider a typical UE located at origin 0 for the ergodicity of PPP described in Slivnyak's Theorem [22] . In Fig.1 , system model during downlink phase is given. The typical UE is served by the typical BS, 1 and is interfered by all the other BSs with fixed transmit powers P t . All the BSs are inevitably intercepted by the randomly-located Eves.
A. CONNECTION PROBABILITY DURING DOWNLINK PHASE
In this subsection, we derive the connection probability of the typical UE during downlink phase. Connection probability is defined as the probability that the signal-to-interferenceand-noise-ratio (SINR) of legitimate channel is larger than a threshold (denoted as θ c ) to satisfy demodulation requirement. Applying the Total Probability Formula, connection probability can be written by averaging on the typical serving distance r 0 as
where I k denotes the interference from tier-k BSs, and N 0 denotes the noise power. f r 0 ,t (r 0 , t) denotes the joint probability distribution function (PDF) of the typical serving distance r 0 when the typical UE is associated with a tier-t BS. f r 0 ,t (r 0 , t) can be given in [14, eq. (10)]. h is the channel gain, which satisfies the Nakagami-m distribution. Thus, |h| 2 satisfies the Gamma distribution, which is given by
where m 0 and 0 are the basic parameters of Gamma distribution. 0 denotes expected value of |h| 2 , and m 0 indicates the ratios of total power and multi-path component power. When m 0 is large, LoS component is strong enough that |h| 2 is near the expected value of |h| 2 (pure LoS case, when m 0 tends to +∞). Especially, Nakagami-m distribution will be well predicted by Rician distribution under large m 0 value. When m 0 is small, multi-path component is strong enough that |h| 2 varies in a large scale. As a special case, Nakagamim distribution will be Rayleigh distribution when m 0 = 1.
We extend the inner part P SINR l (t, r 0 ) θ c in eq. (2) as follows.
where step (a) follows the complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) of the Gamma distribution, and step (b) holds for the following identity [24, (8.352 .
. For the purpose of readability, we put the process of calculating L (p) I 0 (s) and x p in Appendix A. As a result, we derive the connection probability during downlink phase P c,d (θ c ) in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The connection probability of the typical UE over nakagami-m fading channel during downlink phase is given by
where
, and Q is defined as
and k n is given by
where 2 F 1 (a, b; c; x) is Gaussian hypergeometric function. x 0 in eq. (6) is given by
and f r 0 ,t (r 0 , t) is given by [14] 
Proof: Eq. (6) can be derived through invoking eq. (4) and (41) into (2).
B. SECRECY PROBABILITY DURING DOWNLINK PHASE
In this subsection, we derive the secrecy probability of the typical UE during downlink phase. In this paper, secrecy probability is defined as the probability that all the eavesdropping channels' SINRs are less than a threshold (denoted as θ s ), thus fail to meet the demodulation requirement, which is given by
where A t denotes the association probability of the typical UE to tier-t BS, which is obtained by integrating eq. (10) upon r 0 from 0 to D(t) as
and P SINR e (t, z) > θ s } denotes the probability that an Eve's SINR is above θ s , which locates at a distance z away from the typical BS.
Step (a) follows Jensen's inequality. Thus we need to derive P SINR e (t, z) > θ s }, which can be derived through a minor modification of eq. (4) . Thus, we demonstrate the lower bound of the secrecy probability of the typical UE under nakagami-m fading channel in the following Theorem 2. Theorem 2: The lower bound of the secrecy probability of the typical UE over nakagami-m fading channel during downlink phase is given by
. A t and Q is given in eq. (12) and (7). k n in Q is given by
where step (a) is obtained by [24, (3.194. 3)], and B(x, y) is the beta function, which is defined as B(x, y) =
Proof: To complete the proof, we only need to derive the probability P SINR e (t, z) > θ s }, which is similar to the Theorem 1. The only difference is how to calculate k n , because (i) for eavesdropping channel, interfering BSs can be arbitrary near to the Eve, while (ii) for legitimate channel, interfering tier-k BS must be farther than a certain distance
α r 0 , where r 0 is the typical serving distance, otherwise, the typical UE will connect to this BS. Thus, eq. (14) can be derived by the definition k n = (−1) n s n r 2 0 (n+1) g n and modifying the integration in eq. (34) from 0 to +∞.
Next, we derive an upper bound of secrecy probability by only considering the closest Eve. In the following lemma, we prove that the eavesdropping channel to the closest Eve has the largest received signal strength (among all the Eves) in a larger probability under larger m 0 value, which indicates that the derived upper bound is tighter under larger m 0 .
Lemma 1: Under larger m 0 value, it happens in a larger probability that the eavesdropping channel to the closest Eve has the largest received signal strength during downlink phase.
Proof: The proof is demonstrated in Appendix B. Base on the Lemma 1, we give the upper bound of the secrecy probability in the following Theorem 3 through only considering the closest Eve.
Theorem 3: The upper bound of the secrecy probability of the typical UE under nakagami-m fading channel during downlink phase is given by (16) where A t denotes the association probability of the typical UE to tier-t BS, which is given by eq. (12), and
. Q is defined in eq. (7), in which k n is given by eq. (14) . f z (z) denotes the PDF of the closest Eve's distance to the typical BS, which is obtained by using the characteristic of PPP as f z,t (z, t) = 2π λ e z exp −π λ e z
(17)
Proof: We only need to derive the probability P SINR e (t, z) > θ s }, which is derived the same way as that of Theorem 2.
IV. CONNECTION AND SECRECY PERFORMANCE DURING UPLINK PHASE
The main difference between downlink and uplink is the transmit power. During downlink, transmit power is fixed as P t , while transmit power is dynamically adjusted during uplink phase. As depicted in Fig.2 , during uplink phase, transmit power of the typical UE depends on the typical serving distance r as P (t) = P u r βα 0 . The transmit power of interfering UEs is also variable with respect to the serving distances to their serving BSs r i , where i = 1, 2, 3.... When BS density increases, transmit power of typical UE and interfering UEs decrease generally. At the same time, number of interfering UEs increases. Hence, it is necessary to reconsider the connection and secrecy probabilities during uplink phase.
A. CONNECTION PROBABILITY DURING UPLINK PHASE
We extend the connection probability of the typical UE during uplink phase as follows.
where P u r βα 0 gives the transmit power of the typical UE, and I k denotes the interference from the UEs which are served by tier-k BSs. f r 0 ,t (r 0 , t) denotes the joint PDF of the typical serving distance r 0 and the typical UE is associated with a tier-t BS.
Similar as section III, we extend P SINR l (t, r o )
≥ θ c as follows
where I 0 denotes the total interference strength, and s P −1 u r
Step (a) follows the definition
. Similar manipulations can be found in eq. (4). Thus, we need to derive the Laplace transform L I 0 (s) of interference. For the purpose of readability, we demonstrate the proof of L (p) I 0 (s) and x p during uplink phase in the Appendix C. As a result, we derive the connection probability during uplink phase P c,u in the following theorem.
Theorem 4: The connection probability of the typical UE during uplink phase is given by
where s P −1 u r
and x 0 is given by
λ k denotes the density of interfering UEs, which is given by [14, eq. (46)]. Q is given by eq. (7), and k n is given by
f r|k,y (r|k, y)ydrdy (22) and f r 0 ,t (r 0 , t) is given by eq. (10) . r denotes the serving distance of a random interfering UE. f r|k (r|k) denotes the conditioned PDF of distance r when the interfering UE connects to a tier-k BS, which is derived in the Appendix D and is given by
where A k (y) denotes the conditioned association probability that a interfering UE connects to a tier-k BS when the interfering distance is y, which satisfies
Proof: Eq. (20) can be derived through invoking eq. (19) and (56) into (18) , where eq. (56) is given in the Appendix C in detail.
B. SECRECY PROBABILITY DURING UPLINK PHASE
During uplink phase, secrecy probability is derived through averaging upon legitimate channel distance r 0 as
SINR e,t (r 0 ) < θ s f r 0 ,t (r 0 , t)dr 0 (25) where f r 0 ,t (r 0 , t) denotes the joint PDF of legitimate distance r 0 and the typical UE is served by a tier-t BS. P e∈ e SINR e,t (r 0 ) < θ s can be written as
where P SINR e,t (r 0 , z) ≥ θ s denotes the SINR of an Eve, which locates at a distance z away, is above the threshold θ s . From eq. (24), we give the lower bound of secrecy probability in the following theorem.
Theorem 5:
The lower bound of the secrecy probability under nakagami-m fading channel during uplink phase is given by
where s
, f r 0 ,t (r 0 , t) is given by eq. (10), and Q is defined as eq. (7). k n is given by
where f r|k is given in eq. (23). Proof: We only need to derive P SINR e,t (r 0 , z) ≥ θ s in eq. (26) , which can be obtained the same way as eq. (19) .
We derive the upper bound of secrecy probability through only considering the closest Eve. Before deriving the upper bound of the secrecy probability, we prove the following lemma, which indicates that the derived upper bound is tighter under larger m 0 value.
Lemma 2: Under larger m 0 value, it happens in a larger probability that the eavesdropping channel to the closest Eve has the largest received signal strength during uplink phase.
Proof: Notice that eq. (43) in appendix B is obtained regardless of transmit power, thus the proof of Lemma 2 is same as that of the Lemma 1.
Theorem 6: The upper bound of the secrecy probability under nakagami-m fading channel during uplink phase is given by
, and Q is defined as eq. (7). f r 0 ,t (r 0 , t) is given by eq. (10), and f z (z) is given by eq. (17).
V. SIMULATION RESULT
In this section, the derived expressions of connection probability and secrecy probability are validated through 50000 times' simulations over a 10km × 10km area. In every snapshot, network nodes' locations and channel gains are renewed. All the simulation parameters are given in the table 2. It should be emphasized that we fix 0 as 0 = 1 under different m 0 values, which ensures that the expected value of |h| 2 is 1 and guarantee that our comparison is done in a fair way. A 2-tier HCN is assumed, and connection and secrecy performance are simulated under different m 0 values and tier-2 BS's density. Besides, we demonstrate the results of Rayleigh and pure LoS cases (in which channel gain h ≡ 1), which can be special cases of our work.
A. CONNECTION AND SECRECY PERFORMANCE DURING DOWNLINK PHASE
In Fig.3 , we demonstrate the connection probability performance versus tier-2 BS density under different m 0 values. The theoretic results are in quite good agreement with the simulation results, which validates our theoretical manipulation. Simulation results of Rayleigh case can well match the theoretic result of our work by setting m 0 = 1. Besides, LoS case can be well approached by our work through setting large m 0 value. Connection performance is insensitive to BS density, which reveals that denser BS deployment equivalently increases useful signal and interference strengths. This phenomenon is also observed in [29] , in which Rayleigh fading is assumed. Another observation from Fig.3 is that larger m 0 value brings better connection performance, which has not been included in any previous works.
In Fig.4 , we demonstrate the upper and lower bounds of secrecy probability versus m 0 values under different tier-2 BS's densities during downlink phase. From Fig.4 , it can be found that secrecy probability is insensitive with m 0 value. Simulation results is tighter with upper bound than lower bound. Secrecy probability is positively related with BS density, which is obvious because increasing BS density deteriorates the channel quality of eavesdropping channel. Another observation is that the upper bound is tighter under larger m 0 value, which is consistent with Lemma 1. It should also be noticed that larger BS density shrinks the difference between upper and lower bounds.
B. CONNECTION AND SECRECY PERFORMANCE DURING UPLINK PHASE
In Fig.5 , we demonstrate the connection probability performance versus tier-2 BS density under different m 0 values during uplink phase. Network connection probability can be well predicted through our theoretical analysis, which validates our theoretical manipulation. Simulation results of Rayleigh case can well match the theoretic result of our work by setting m 0 = 1. Besides, LoS case can be well predicted by our work through setting large m 0 value. Different from that of downlink phase, connection performance during uplink phase is an decreasing function of BS density. This is because that although increasing BS increases the useful signal and interference, the probability that there exists idle BS increases as well. This is also observed in [30] . Larger m 0 value brings better connection performance, which is similar with that of downlink phase.
In Fig.6 , we demonstrate the upper and lower bounds of secrecy probability versus m 0 values under different tier-2 BS densities during uplink phase. From Fig.6 , it can be found that secrecy probability is insensitive with m 0 value. Simulation results is tighter with upper bound than lower bound. Secrecy probability is positively related with BS density, which is because increasing BS density deteriorates the channel quality of eavesdropping channel. Another observation is that the upper bound is tighter under larger m 0 value, which is consistent with Lemma 2. Similar with that during downlink phase, upper and lower bounds are tighter under larger BS density.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we analyze the PLS performance over Nakagami-m fading channel under the HCN during both downlink and uplink phases. Connection and secrecy probabilities are used to evaluate the PLS performance. We derive the analytical expressions of connection probability in a tractable form, and lower-and upper-bounds of secrecy probability through considering the closest Eve and using Jensen's inequality respectively. Simulation results show that Rayleigh and LoS models can be regarded as special cases of our work. Effects of different parameters upon network performance are obtained, which provide helpful insights for future network design and deployment.
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APPENDIX A THE DERIVATION OF x p DURING DOWNLINK PHASE
we need to derive the Laplace transform L I 0 (s) of interference during downlink phase as
where step (a) follows the fact that interference comes from all BSs except for the typical one.
Step (b) follows probability generating functional (PGFL) of the PPP [22] . d k denotes the minimum distance between the tier-k interfering BSs and the typical UE, which can be given by d k = ( 
and L (0) I 0 (s) is given by applying [23, (8) ] and [24, (3.194.1) ] as
Applying [24, (3.194 .1)], the above eq. (34) can be simplified as
Thus eq. (32) can be written as the follow recurrence form
Denoting
(s) as which is done in eq. (4), eq. (36) can further be simplified as
g p−i , thus the above eq. (37) becomes
According to [25] , we denote
Therefore, x can be written from eq. (38) as x = r 2 0 x 0 k + r 2 0 Gx, which can further be written as
Similar to [25] , the above eq. (40) can be written in a closed form as follows
where Q is defined in eq. (7).
APPENDIX B THE PROOF OF UPPER BOUND
Define z 1 and h 1 are the distance and channel coefficient between the typical BS and the closest Eve. z k and h k are the distance and channel coefficient between the typical BS and the kth closest Eve. And define the set S = k 2 :
. We prove the probability P{S = ∅} is large under large m 0 values. First, we calculate the following conditioned probability as
where step (a) follows the PGFL of PPP formed by randomlylocated Eves, and step (b) follows the CCDF of the Gamma distribution. Thus the probability P{S = ∅} can be derived through averaging eq.(42) upon z 1 and |h 1 | 2 as follows Fig.7 demonstrates the probability P em P{S = ∅} under different m 0 and α values. This probability is large, e.g. 84.7%, 88.6% and 93.1% when m 0 = 11 and α = 2, α = 3, α = 4, respectively.
Thus completes the proof.
APPENDIX C THE DERIVATION OF x p DURING UPLINK PHASE
We derive the Laplace transform L I 0 (s) of interference during uplink phase as
where k,u denotes the PPP of tier-t interfering UEs. r k,i denotes the serving distance between ith tier-k interfering UE and its serving BS, while y k,i and h k,i denote the distance and channel fading coefficient between the ith tier-k interfering UE and the typical BS. λ k denotes the density of interfering UEs, which equals the density of active BSs 2 and is given by [14, (6) ]
Step (a) is obtained using PGFL of tier-k interfering UEs k,u and assuming that tier-k interfering UEs follows a PPP process with a same density with that of tier-k active BSs [14] . ω k (s, y) denotes the laplace transform of the interference from a tier-k interfering UE at a distance y, which is given by
where r max = (
α y follows the fact that the serving distance between the considered interfering UE and its serving BS must be less than (
α y, otherwise the interfering UE will connect to the typical BS.
Step (a) follows the characteristic function (CF) of the Gamma function. f r|k,y (r|k, y) denotes the conditioned PDF of the serving distance r of the interfering UE, conditioned on the interfering UE is served by a tier-k BS and its interfering channel distance to the typical serving BS is y, is given by , and A k (y) denotes the probability that the interfering UE is served by a tier-k BS when its interfering channel distance is y, which is given by 
where x 0 = g 0 is given by eq. (21) . Hence, eq. (55) can be further expressed in the following closed form.
where Q is give by eq. (7).
APPENDIX D DERIVATION OF f r |k,y (r |k, y )
Let r denotes the serving distance of a certain interfering UE when served by a tier-k BS, and y denotes the distance of the interfering channel to the typical BS. Thus P t y −α ≤ P k r −α , hence r r max = ( 
